Swapped Disincentives: Will Clearinghouses Mitigate the Unintended Effects of the Bankruptcy Code\u27s Swap Exemptions? by Sullivan, Timothy P.W.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 3 Article 17 
December 2011 
Swapped Disincentives: Will Clearinghouses Mitigate the 
Unintended Effects of the Bankruptcy Code's Swap Exemptions? 
Timothy P.W. Sullivan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Timothy P.W. Sullivan, Swapped Disincentives: Will Clearinghouses Mitigate the Unintended Effects of the 
Bankruptcy Code's Swap Exemptions?, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1491 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss3/17 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 1491 
COMMENT 
SWAPPED DISINCENTIVES:                                 
WILL CLEARINGHOUSES MITIGATE                
THE UNINTENDED EFFECTS OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY CODE’S SWAP EXEMPTIONS? 
Timothy P.W. Sullivan*
 
 
The Bankruptcy Code contains exemptions for swap agreements that 
allow creditors to seize collateral, to terminate their contract, and to net 
obligations once the debtor files for bankruptcy.  By privileging this class of 
creditors, these provisions reduce incentives to monitor counterparty risk, 
and thus magnified losses experienced during the recent financial crisis.  
Congress overlooked this role of the Bankruptcy Code in destabilizing the 
financial system.  Instead, its response was to require that all swaps be 
traded through a clearinghouse.  This failure to address one of the 
contributing factors to the swap market’s collapse should be worrisome, as 
a clearinghouse’s traditional risk management devices likely cannot 
prevent a similar crisis in the future.  Nonetheless, under the proper 
conditions, a clearinghouse theoretically has greater incentives to monitor 
counterparty risk than its individual members, thereby strengthening 
market discipline and financial stability.  In order to realize this incentive 
structure, certain regulatory measures are necessary, namely heightened 
disclosure requirements and strict governance rules designed to preserve 
the independence of the clearinghouse’s board from its members. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, credit default swaps (CDSs) were still relatively exotic financial 
instruments, trading at a volume of around $180 billion.1  The next decade 
saw an explosion in their use, with approximately $34.422 trillion trading in 
2006, and $62.173 trillion in 2007.2  Many lauded this development, both 
as “a major advance in risk management for all financial intermediaries,” 
and for providing “a market-based reading of the risks of companies that is 
not available from any other source and that can be of major assistance to 
regulators, as well as investors and creditors.”3
This growth was accompanied by a privileged status in the Bankruptcy 
Code (Code), as Congress believed it necessary to contain systemic risk in 
the event of a large institution’s insolvency.  Its reasoning, eventually 
applied to all swap agreements, was fairly straightforward:  rather than 
waiting for a lengthy bankruptcy proceeding to share assets with other 
creditors, a cash-strapped swap party could now immediately seize 
collateral and terminate its contract with the debtor.
 
4  By permitting these 
actions, privileged status would help to maintain liquidity precisely when 
the financial system needed it most.5
 
 1. Mike Jakola, Credit Default Swap Index Options:  Evaluating the Viability of a New 
Product for the CBOE, FIN. INSTS. & MKT. RESEARCH CTR., KELLOGG SCH. OF MGMT. 3 
(June 2, 2006), http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/fimrc/papers/jakola.pdf. 
  However, this systemic elixir came 
packaged with an unforeseen side effect:  because creditors became more 
concerned with the debtor’s ability to post collateral than to repay the 
underlying debt, these provisions ultimately reduced private market 
 2. ISDA Market Survey, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N (2010), 
http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market-Survey-annual-data.pdf. 
 3. Peter J. Wallison, Everything You Wanted to Know About Credit Default Swaps—
But Were Never Told, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH 10 (Dec. 2008), 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20090107_12DecFSOg.pdf. 
 4. See infra Part II.C. 
 5. See infra Part II.C.   
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incentives to monitor counterparty risk.6  In response to the perceived 
security of these contracts, one financial analyst noted that “[d]ue to these 
credit enhancements, market participants commonly view interest rate 
swaps as free of counterparty default risk.”7
This distortion to market discipline lay dormant until 2008, when Bear 
Stearns—with nearly a quarter of its assets subject to the Code’s privileged 
status—suffered a bank run.
 
8  AIG Financial Products (AIG), with $400 
billion in credit default swap exposure and a mere $100 billion in equity, 
required a federal bailout not long thereafter.9  In a recent article, Professor 
Mark J. Roe argues that if the Code’s priority treatment of these instruments 
had been narrower, these firms would have been “less financially central 
and less interconnected.  They would likely have had less super-priority 
debt.  The financial system would have been more resilient.”10
Despite their loss-magnifying effects, these exemptions were not 
addressed in the recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act
  As the dust 
from the credit crisis begins to settle, these provisions of the Code 
exempting swaps from the normal rules of bankruptcy appear to be an 
important yet overlooked culprit in destabilizing the financial system.   
11 (Dodd-Frank).  Instead, Congress’s response was to 
require that all swaps be guaranteed by clearinghouses.12  The so-called 
“clearing mandate” came to be regarded as one of Dodd-Frank’s “most 
notable provisions affecting the OTC derivatives market,”13 and even 
considered by some to be its “biggest win of all.”14
This Comment seeks to address each of these questions.  To be certain, it 
may be optimal to limit particular swap exemptions and thereby target the 
root cause of these disincentives, as some scholars have advocated.  
However, it is important to survey the capacity of clearinghouses to bolster 
market discipline in the event that Congress either fails to or delays in 
addressing that issue.  This is especially true because, having recently 
  But will Congress’s 
decision to opt for the clearing mandate instead of limiting the Code’s 
exemptions merely shift these disincentives from banks to clearinghouses?  
Or is there something inherent in the structure of a clearinghouse which can 
induce more diligent assessment of counterparty risk?  And if the answer to 
this latter question is “yes,” are there specific regulatory oversights 
necessary to preserve that integrity? 
 
 6. See infra Part II.D. 
 7. Michael Johannes & Suresh Sundaresan, The Impact of Collateralization on Swap 
Rates, 62 J. FIN. 383, 383 (2007). 
 8. Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Players’ Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis 
Accelerator 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 552 (2011). 
 9. Id. at 550; see infra notes 52–55 and accompany text. 
 10. Id. at 542. 
 11. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 12. See id. § 723(a), 124 Stat. at 1675–81.  
 13. David S. Huntington, Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation Legislation, 
HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2010, 9:15 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/07/summary-of-dodd-frank-financial-
regulation-legislation/. 
 14. Matt Taibbi, Wall Street’s Big Win, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 6, 2010, at 57.  
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passed Dodd-Frank, Congress may lack a political constituency for reform 
until the next crisis event.15
Part I provides a necessary background for understanding the issues at 
hand.  It begins by orienting the reader with a brief explanation of 
derivatives.  Next, it discusses swaps—a particular class of derivatives not 
only at the heart of the recent financial crisis, but also subject to certain 
exemptions from the Bankruptcy Code’s normal rules.  Finally, it provides 
a primer on the business of clearing, and discusses Congress’s theoretical 
justifications for the clearing mandate as a response to the recent failure of 
the swap market. 
 
Part II introduces the Code’s exemptions for swaps, and the role they 
played in the recent financial crisis.  It begins by exploring the central 
justification for the Code, and three bedrock rules which further that 
justification.  It then outlines in detail each of the provisions which exempt 
swaps from these principles of bankruptcy law.  Next, it discusses 
Congress’s justifications for passing these exemptions.  Finally, it explains 
how these provisions reduce market discipline by weakening incentives to 
hedge against counterparty risk. 
Part III explores how a clearinghouse might strengthen market discipline, 
and thus restore stability to the swap market.  It begins by explaining which 
basic elements of a clearinghouse, and similarly those often extolled by 
commentators, are not capable of preventing a future AIG-type failure.  It 
then focuses on how a clearinghouse would theoretically have greater 
incentives to monitor counterparty risk than its individual members.  
Finally, building upon this framework, it highlights several key issues that 
regulators should focus on to ensure that clearinghouses do in fact engage 
in more rigorous market discipline. 
I.  THE BASICS OF BILATERAL AND CLEARED SWAP MARKETS 
This part presents a financial and historical context for the legal issues 
discussed later in this Comment.  It begins by providing a background in 
the financial instruments that are generally subject to the Code’s 
exemptions, as well as the clearing mandate.  In particular, it describes each 
class of instruments and outlines their uses in the financial system.  
Additionally, this section places its emphasis on one particular type of 
swap—the credit default swap—because of its central role in the financial 
crisis.  Finally, it discusses the clearing mandate as a direct policy response 
to the failure of the swap market. 
A.  What Is a Derivative? 
Stated in the most abstract terms, a derivative is a financial agreement 
with an economic value dictated by a specified variable,16
 
 15. See infra note 
 sometimes 
188 and accompanying text. 
 16. See Bernard J. Karol, Regulation of Financial Derivatives:  An Overview of 
Derivatives as Risk Management Tools, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 195, 195 (1995) (defining 
derivatives as “contracts or securities whose values depend on (or ‘derive’ from) the prices 
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referred to as the “underlying.”17  Other important features include the 
notional amount and the outstanding notional amount.  The notional amount 
refers to the number of units of “underlying” specified in the contract.18  
The outstanding notional amount is the “notional amount multiplied by the 
contract price per unit of underlying.”19
To illustrate, consider the following example of a derivative with which 
many readers may be familiar:  an options contract.
 
20
Why might A enter into such an agreement?  Derivatives can be used for 
two essential purposes:  hedging against risk and speculating.
  A, the purchaser of 
the option, pays a specified amount to B, the seller, in consideration for the 
right (but not obligation) to buy five pounds of hops at $100 per pound.  
Here, the notional amount is five, the contract price per unit of underlying is 
$100, and the outstanding notional amount is $500.  It is important to see 
how the value of this option will be “derived” from the current market price 
of hops (the variable).  Consider that the option will only be valuable to A if 
the current market price of hops is higher than $100 per pound.  In that 
case, A will exercise its option and purchase the hops from B for less than it 
would have paid on the open market.  If, however, the price of hops is 
below $100 per pound, then the option is worthless to A. 
21  To 
illustrate, let us continue with the example of an options contract.  Assume 
that A is a small, local brewer.  Because a principal ingredient in beer is 
hops,22 brewers are particularly sensitive to changes in their market price.  
A spike in their price, perhaps owing to a drought in areas where hops are 
grown (as occurred in 200723), could therefore lead to disastrous 
consequences for brewers without financial protection.24  A could insure 
against this risk by entering into an options contract with B, a hops 
producer, giving A the right to purchase a certain quantity at a fixed price.  
A has now insulated himself from price fluctuations by shifting that risk to 
B.25
 
of underlying assets”); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, § 610(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 1612 (defining a derivative as “any transaction that . . . is 
based, in whole or in part, on the value of, any interest in, or any quantitative measure or the 
occurrence of any event relating to, one or more commodities, securities, currencies, interest 
or other rates, indices, or other assets”). 
 
 17. See Norman Menachem Feder, Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677, 681.  Feder notes that “[u]nderlyings can be anything that 
interests markets:  cash instruments, like stocks and bonds; tangibles, like commodities; or 
intangibles, like interest rates, currency rates, stock market indices, and credit quality.” Id. 
 18. See id. at 683. 
 19. Id. at 683–84. 
 20. See Karol, supra note 16, at 195 (defining an “option”). 
 21. See Stephen J. Lubben, The Bankruptcy Code Without Safe Harbors, 84 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 123, 125 (2010). 
 22. Tom Bowers, Trouble Brewing:  Price of Hops Hits Home, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW 
(Jan. 9, 2008), http://www.spokesmanreview.com/tools/story_pf.asp?ID=226938. 
 23. Id. (noting a resultant six-fold increase in the price of hops, in some instances). 
 24. Id. (predicting the failure of small, local brewers). 
 25. Feder, supra note 17, at 683 (“Importantly, derivatives do not eliminate underlying 
risk; they only reposition it.”). 
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However, this simple options contract could also be used by A to 
speculate on the price of hops.26  Assume that A, now a speculator, has a 
gut feeling that the Hallertau region of Bavaria27 will soon experience 
uncharacteristically low rainfall.  In order to capitalize on this prescience, it 
might purchase an option from B, a hops grower.  When the drought does in 
fact come, there will be a shortage of hops, driving up the price.  A can now 
exercise its option and resell those hops in the market for a large windfall.  
Moreover, if A believed that there would be a robust growing season and a 
consequent surplus of hops, it could have also speculated by selling options.  
Assuming A was right and the price did fall below that fixed in the contract, 
then the option would expire unexercised and A would walk away with a 
profit from the sale of the option.  Thus, parties are capable of speculating 
on both sides of the transaction.28
B.  What Is a Swap? 
 
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association defines a “swap” as 
“[a] derivative where two counterparties exchange streams of cashflows 
with each other. These streams are known as the legs of the swap and are 
calculated by reference to a notional amount.”29
Interest rate swaps allow a party to exchange variable interest rate 
payments for fixed interest rate payments.
  This definition will 
become clearer after reviewing the five most important types of swap 
agreements below. 
30
Company A owes $10 million at a floating rate of interest—LIBOR plus 
1%—and would like to rearrange its obligation to a fixed rate to give it 
greater predictability.  The company can swap its payment obligations 
with Bank B. Company A will periodically pay to Bank B a fixed rate of 
interest—11%—on a notional amount of $10 million, and Bank B will 
pay to Company A on the same schedule the periodic payments of LIBOR 
plus 1% on the same notional amount . . . .  This neutralizes Company A’s 
market risk in LIBO rates.  If Bank B lends money at floating interest 
rates, the transaction ensures an interest rate spread between what the 
bank pays and what it obtains.
  Why would a company enter 
into such an agreement?  Norman Feder explains its benefits as follows: 
31
Thus, Bank A gets greater predictability in the form of a fixed rate liability, 
and Bank B gets a premium for taking on a variable interest rate.  This will 
 
 
 26. A speculator buys or sells something so as to profit off of changes in its price, rather 
than to insure against an underlying risk. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1529 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 27. The Hallertau region of Bavaria is a famous region for growing hops.  See MICHAEL 
JACKSON, ULTIMATE BEER 15 (1998). 
 28. The practical difference is that the seller is taking a short position on the underlying 
variable (he is betting that prices will fall), whereas the buyer is taking a long position (he is 
betting that prices will increase). 
 29. Glossary, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, http://www2.isda.org/functional-
areas/research/Glossary (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 30. See Karol, supra note 16, at 200. 
 31. Feder, supra note 17, at 702–03. 
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be a particularly important risk management tool for Bank A if, like many 
banks, it has fixed rate assets:  the swap allows it to shield itself from the 
risk that the interest rate on its liabilities will increase, eventually exceeding 
that of its assets.32  With $364.378 trillion in notional amount outstanding 
as of the second half of 2010, interest rate swaps are by far the most 
significant type of swap.33
A currency swap is an “agreement to swap specified payment obligations 
denominated in one currency for specified payment obligations 
denominated in a different currency.”
 
34
A very typical situation is a U.S. corporation that has a subsidiary in 
Europe and has revenues from Europe.  The corporation is going to have 
Euro cash flow coming in.  Now, in the United States, it has to pay its 
bondholders, and servicing its bondholders is always going to be in 
dollars.  So the corporation will swap those European revenues with a 
swap counterparty, and get dollars. The dollars then go to the bondholders 
and the corporation has matched those risks.
  This allows parties to secure a 
steady flow of money in a desired currency, mitigating currency risk arising 
out of volatile foreign exchange markets.  Ruth W. Ainslie explains a 
common use of these instruments: 
35
If the U.S. corporation had not done so and the euro subsequently collapsed, 
then income from its subsidiary would buy far fewer dollars on a foreign 
exchange market.  It could therefore find itself struggling to pay off its 
dollar denominated debt.  In the second half of 2010, currency swaps had 
$19.271 trillion in notional amount outstanding.
 
36
Commodity swaps involve the exchange of a fixed payment for a 
payment based upon the market price of a commodity.
 
37  This enables both 
purchasers and sellers of goods to eliminate the risk of price volatility.  To 
illustrate, let us return to our hypothetical brewer.  In order to hedge against 
the risk of an increase in the price of hops, he can agree to pay a bank a 
fixed amount, in return for the market price of hops multiplied by the 
notional amount.  He can then use these payments to purchase the amount 
needed to meet production.  As of the second half of 2010, there were 
$1.781 trillion notional amount outstanding in commodity forwards and 
swaps.38
Equity swaps involve the exchange of a payment based upon a specified 
equity index, share, or basket of shares, for either another payment based 
 
 
 32. See Wallison, supra note 3, at 4. 
 33. OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the Second Half of 2010, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS 8 (2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1105.pdf [hereinafter BIS Report]. 
 34. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 1585. 
 35. Ruth W. Ainslie, Industry Perspective, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 14, 15–16 
(2000). 
 36. See BIS Report, supra note 33, at 8. 
 37. Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?:  The Inadequacies of 
Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC Derivatives Transactions, 24 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 379, 386 (1999). 
 38. See BIS Report, supra note 33, at 8. 
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upon equity prices, or a payment based upon a fixed notional amount.39  
This allows parties to hedge against the risk of equity price volatility.  At 
the end of 2010, equity-linked forwards and swaps constituted $1.828 
trillion in notional amount outstanding.40
A credit default swap “is nothing more than a contract in which one party 
(the protection seller) agrees to reimburse another party (the protection 
buyer) against a default on a financial obligation by a third party (the 
reference entity).”
 
41  Thus, the protection buyer has effectively purchased 
“insurance” against the risk of default on that obligation.42  Because the 
issuer of protection is now legally obligated to pay its counterparty for loss 
on the underlying financial obligation, it may itself wish to purchase 
protection for all or a part of the notional amount it insured.  It can do so by 
entering into another CDS with a different party, making the original issuer 
the new protection buyer. The new protection seller may in turn wish to 
insure himself, and so on.  In this scenario, risks of default can be 
transferred and spread across many different parties, a process known in 
financial jargon as a “daisy chain.”43  As of the end of 2010, there were 
$29.898 trillion notional amount outstanding in credit default swaps, 
making them second only to interest rate swaps in terms of volume.44
By operation of the CDS daisy chain, multiple financial institutions are 
able to mutually reduce their credit risks via diversification.
 
45  Peter J. 
Wallison illustrates by using the example of a bank which has made a 
corporate loan to an oil manufacturer.  A drop in oil prices may reduce the 
creditworthiness of the manufacturer, increasing the risk of default.  In 
order to hedge against this risk, the bank would prefer exposure to assets 
with either uncorrelated or negatively correlated risks (as the risk of one 
increases, the risk of the other either is unaffected or decreases, 
respectively).  The bank can do so via a two-step process.  First, it can 
purchase protection on the corporate loan from a CDS dealer, who in turn 
seeks protection from an insurance company.  An insurance company is an 
ideal choice, as exposure to the oil industry could provide much-needed 
diversification to its primarily commercial real estate-based portfolio.  Next, 
the original bank issues CDS protection to a hedge fund on a loan made to 
auto dealers, a negatively correlated risk to the oil industry.46  As a result of 
this series of CDS transactions, both the bank and the insurance company 
have balanced their portfolios and decreased their own credit risk.  Thus, 
CDSs can be an extraordinarily valuable risk management tool.47
 
 39. See Feder, supra note 
 
17, at 706. 
 40. See BIS Report, supra note 33, at 8. 
 41. See Wallison, supra note 3, at 3.  Thus, the performance of the financial obligation is 
the underlying variable from which the value of the CDS is derived. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See BIS Report, supra note 33, at 8. 
 45. See Wallison, supra note 3, at 6. 
 46. As oil becomes more expensive, demand for cars decreases, and vice versa. 
 47. In addition to this hedging function, CDSs are frequently used for speculation—just 
like any other derivative. Michael Greenberger, Out of the Black Hole:  Regulatory Reform 
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It is helpful briefly to highlight how these CDS transactions are 
structured.  As Wallison notes, “The CDS market is a dealer market, so 
transactions take place through dealers, over the counter rather than on an 
exchange.”48  Thus, derivatives are negotiated bilaterally in accordance 
with parties’ particular needs, as opposed to on an exchange, which requires 
a much higher degree of standardization.49  The seller of protection is 
typically required to post collateral to secure its performance.50  
Additionally, the contract will often contain a provision which requires the 
posting of additional collateral if a materially adverse event should occur, 
such as a decline in the credit rating of the reference entity, or the 
counterparty to the CDS agreement itself.51  The price of the CDS is 
dictated by the creditworthiness of the underlying reference entity.52  If the 
risk of default increases, then sellers of protection will demand higher 
premium payments—known as the CDS’s spread—to compensate for this 
additional risk.53
CDSs were a principal device for insuring investments in the subprime 
mortgage market.
  If the risk of default decreases, then buyers can bargain 
for a lower cost of protection. 
54  Although the securitization process is beyond the 
scope of this Comment, it will suffice to note that the process worked by 
offering protection on mortgage-backed securities, which were in turn 
secured by home mortgages.55
 
of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market, ROOSEVELT INST. 101 (2009), 
http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/OTC%20Derivatives.pdf.  To illustrate, in 
2008 three in every four CDSs were “naked,” that is, not insuring against the default of an 
underlying loan owned by a party to the swap agreement. See id.  This practice would have 
been illegal under state insurance law as insuring someone else’s risk. See id. 
  From the perspective of issuers of 
 48. Wallison, supra note 3, at 3.  Precisely why these transactions have tended to take 
place over-the-counter (OTC) rather than on an exchange is a fascinating question. See, e.g., 
Karol, supra note 16, at 199 (listing the primary benefits of OTC products as providing 
confidentiality, avoiding position limits and margin requirements, and allowing for 
customization); Wallace C. Turbeville, Derivatives Clearinghouses in the Era of Financial 
Reform, ROOSEVELT INST., 8 (Oct. 24, 2010), http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/
wallace_clearinghouse.pdf (noting that financial institutions can utilize a line of credit in lieu 
of collateral, which is “much more lucrative than straightforward corporate lending,” and 
that the line of credit is not reported in the same manner as direct lending, and thus end 
users’ balance sheets appear more healthy).  Prior to the enactment of the Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2006), some types of 
derivatives were required to be traded on exchanges overseen by the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission. See Greenberger, supra note 47, at 99–100. 
 49. See Karol, supra note 16, at 199. 
 50. Wallison, supra note 3, at 3.  Under certain circumstances, buyers of protection may 
also have to post collateral to ensure they continue to make premium payments. Id. 
 51. Id. at 3, 7. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See VIRAL ACHARYA ET AL., RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY:  HOW TO REPAIR A 
FAILED SYSTEM (2009).  When the creditworthiness of the reference entity changes after the 
CDS has been executed, one of the parties will be getting a windfall, known as being “in the 
money”; if the creditworthiness increases, then the buyer is paying more for protection than 
he could purchase on the open market, known as being “out of the money.” See Wallison, 
supra note 3, at 3. 
 54. See Greenberger, supra note 47, at 100. 
 55. See id. 
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protection such as AIG, CDSs were viewed as a cheap source of additional 
revenue, with little to no risk of payouts.56  This business model proved to 
be catastrophically misplaced as the real estate market collapsed in 2007.  
In September 2008, AIG’s credit rating was downgraded due to its large 
CDS exposure, triggering concerns over the insurer’s creditworthiness.57  
As a response, counterparties began demanding collateral en masse as CDS 
spreads sky-rocketed.58  Eventually, AIG was no longer able to meet these 
collateral calls, prompting an $85 billion government bailout shortly 
thereafter.59  This sequence of events was a primary factor in motivating 
Congress to require all swaps to be cleared as part of Dodd-Frank.60
C.  The Business of Clearing 
  The 
next section discusses the function of clearing and precisely why its 
proponents believe so strongly that it might prevent a similar collapse in the 
future. 
The essential purpose of a clearinghouse is to shield its members from 
counterparty risk.61
As an initial matter, it is important to note that this organization does not 
eliminate any risk per se.
  Clearinghouses enter into bilateral contracts with the 
parties on both sides of a swap transaction, acting as a “middleman” who 
buys the financial product from one party and sells it to another.  
Consequently, the clearinghouse itself bears the costs of a party’s default, 
rather than its members.   
62  On the contrary, “[f]rom the perspective of 
market participants, the credit risk of the [clearinghouse] is substituted for 
the credit risk of the other participants.”63
 
 56. See id. at 101. 
  A clearinghouse, just like an 
individual firm in a bilateral transaction, might be managed poorly or 
experience a series of unfortunate events, causing it to become insolvent 
and default on its obligations.  But if the structure of a clearinghouse does 
not itself eliminate any risk, then why do its proponents favor it? 
 57. AIG Hit with Downgrades to Debt Ratings, CBS NEWS (Sept. 16, 2008),  
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/16/business/main4452015.shtml. 
 58. U.S. Announces $85 Billion Bailout of AIG, CBS NEWS (Sept. 16, 2008), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/09/16/business/main4453942.shtml. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. 2, at 29–31 (2010) (discussing AIG’s failure as a 
basis for the clearing mandate). 
 61. Kirsi Ripatti, Central Counterparty Clearing:  Constructing a Framework for 
Evaluation of Risks and Benefits 9 (Bank of Finland Discussion Papers, Dec. 30, 2004), 
available at http://129.3.20.41/eps/fin/papers/0508/0508021.pdf.  
 62. Turbeville, supra note 48, at 2 (“The first thing to know about clearing is that it does 
not eliminate any risk.  In fact, it concentrates the credit risk inherent in derivatives 
transactions.” (emphasis added)). 
 63. Ripatti, supra note 61, at 9; Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Exchanges 3 
(Council on Foreign Relations, Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation Paper, 
July 2009), http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Squam_Lake_Working_
Paper5.pdf [hereinafter Squam Lake Working Paper] (“Once the swap is cleared, the original 
counterparties are insulated from direct exposure to each other’s default, and rely instead on 
the performance of the clearinghouse.”). 
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 The answer lies in the fact that clearinghouses theoretically offer 
efficiency gains and possess tools enabling them to limit potential losses.64  
First, centralization of transaction processing and risk management offers 
substantial efficiency gains.65  “[H]igh-volume, developed markets,” such 
as the United States, typically benefit from delegating these tasks to a 
central, specialized institution.66  For example, “the internationalisation of 
securities trading, the introduction of new electronic platforms and the 
switch to order-driven anonymous trading systems in national stock 
exchanges have made it increasingly impossible for trading parties to 
control counterparty risk themselves.”67  Thus, it may be inefficient, if not 
impracticable, for individual firms to monitor the creditworthiness of each 
of their counterparties.68  Many believe that these informational 
deficiencies had systemic consequences during the most recent financial 
crisis:  “Lack of transparency in the massive OTC market intensified 
systemic fears during the crisis about interrelated derivatives exposures 
from counterparty risk.  These counterparty risk concerns played an 
important role in freezing up credit markets around the failures of Bear 
Stearns, AIG, and Lehman Brothers.”69  A similar, although more 
mundane, concern is that clearinghouses “generally offer straight-through 
processing facilities aimed at reducing back-office bottlenecks”70 that have 
been observed at dealer firms.71
Second, the ability to multilaterally net exposures by offsetting position 
values (“netting”) is a primary benefit of clearinghouses.
 
72  Netting 
essentially means that claims can be offset against liabilities, resulting in 
one “net” liability.73  Let us first consider the benefits of bilateral netting.  
Assume that A owes B $50, and B owes A $100.  If A defaulted on its 
obligation to B, netting would allow B to offset this claim against its 
liability to A, resulting in one net liability of $50.  Therefore, B has limited 
its loss in the event of the default.  This device has been widely adopted by 
OTC derivatives dealers.74
 
 64. See Ripatti, supra note 
 
61, at 16 (“The primary force behind the creation of 
[clearinghouses] is the economic interest of capital market participants in lowering the 
market-side risks and costs of post-trade processing.”). 
 65. OTC Derivatives:  Settlement Procedures and Counterparty Risk Management, 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 26 (1998), http://www.bis.org/publ/ecsc08.htm [hereinafter 
Counterparty Risk Management]. 
 66. Ripatti, supra note 61, at 13. 
 67. Id. at 17. 
 68. See id. at 19 (“This does not mean that [clearinghouses] eliminate counterparty 
credit risk; they rather manage and redistribute it far more efficiently than market 
participants could do in isolation.”). 
 69. S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. 2, at 30 (2010). 
 70. See Ripatti, supra note 61, at 18. 
 71. See generally Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65 (discussing 
deficiencies in the settlement and risk management processes of individual dealer firms). 
 72. Squam Lake Working Paper, supra note 63, at 3. 
 73. Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65, at 37 (“In effect, multilateral netting 
allows the clearing members to offset their net liabilities to some members against their net 
claims on other members.”). 
 74. See id. at 2. 
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The benefits of bilateral netting are limited to situations where claims are 
against—and liabilities are owed to—the same party.  Multilateral netting, 
by contrast, allows for exposures to one party to be offset against exposures 
to a different party.75
Suppose, to pick an ideal example, that Dealer A has an exposure on 
credit derivatives to Dealer B of $ 1 billion, before considering collateral.  
That is, if Dealer B fails, then A would lose $ 1 billion.  Likewise, B has 
an exposure to Dealer C of $ 1 billion, and C has an exposure to A of $ 1 
billion.  Without a clearinghouse, default by A, B, or C leads to a loss of $ 
1 billion.  With clearing, however, the positive and negative exposures of 
each counterparty cancel, and each poses no risk to anyone, including the 
clearinghouse.
  To illustrate its advantages, consider the following 
hypothetical from the Squam Lake Working Group on Financial 
Regulation: 
76
In other words, because the clearinghouse is a counterparty to all trades, it 
can offset its claim against a defaulting clearing member with any amount 
still owed to that clearing member.  As a practical matter, this means that 
the clearinghouse is fully repaid to the extent of that offset amount.  Thus, 
multilateral netting can result in fewer overall losses.
 
77
 Additionally, the advantages of bilateral netting are “limited by systems 
constraints, such as incomplete systems integration, that make it difficult 
for dealers to calculate and administer net payments.”
   
78   Clearinghouses 
could offer a solution to this problem by institutionalizing settlement 
procedures and risk management.  Just how effective can netting be?  One 
study found that bilateral netting provisions decreased total credit exposure 
by 20 to 60 percent.79
 
 75. Squam Lake Working Paper, supra note 
  For reasons discussed above, one would expect these 
benefits to be greater if netting occurred through a central clearinghouse. 
63, at 3. 
 76. Id.  
 77. This raises important questions:  how many clearinghouses should there be, and how 
many different types of contracts should they clear?  Commentators note that if there are 
many clearinghouses clearing a limited number of contracts, then the benefits of multilateral 
netting will be minimal. See Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65, at 6; Squam 
Lake Working Paper, supra note 63, at 4 (“[I]mportant opportunities to net offsetting credit 
default swaps may be lost if clearing is scattered across several institutions.”). But see 
Turbeville, supra note 48, at 14 (noting that if clearinghouses were also forced to clear 
products with “unpredictable illiquidity and volatility” and management systems did not 
work properly, then “the consequences could be even worse”).  Thus, the optimal size of a 
clearinghouse is itself a crucial question. 
 78. Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65, at 2. 
 79. Id. at 2.  However, the study proceeded to note the limits of bilateral netting as a risk 
management device: 
Despite the widespread use of bilateral netting, OTC derivatives have become a 
significant source of credit exposures between the global financial institutions that are 
the largest dealers.  Consequently, if a major global financial institution were to fail, 
losses to other dealers on OTC derivatives would be a potential channel for the 
transmission of systemic disturbances.   
Id. at 5.  This report was written in 1998, one decade before these concerns were eventually 
realized. 
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An additional benefit of netting is that it can promote liquidity.  Members 
would only be required to post collateral on their net, as opposed to gross, 
exposures.80  The Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation 
notes that as a result, “clearinghouses reduce . . . the demand for collateral, 
a precious resource, especially during a financial crisis.”81
Third, some commentators have asserted that clearinghouses employ 
methods and systems for managing counterparty risk that are superior to 
those used by dealers.
  In other words, 
netting might be able to ease liquidity pressures by allowing for more 
efficient use of collateral. 
82
The practical consequence of a counterparty default is that a 
clearinghouse must go out onto the market and purchase a replacement 
contract.
  To understand this assertion, it is necessary first to 
explore the nature of counterparty risk in the swap market, and how the 
tools used by clearinghouses manage those risks. 
83  In so doing, the clearinghouse stands to suffer a loss if the price 
of the contract is now higher than the original purchase price.84  The risk of 
this loss is referred to as “mark-to-market risk.”85    Clearinghouses protect 
against these losses by requiring members to post collateral, or “margin” in 
clearing jargon.86  In particular, a clearinghouse uses two different devices:  
maintenance margins and initial margins.87
 
 80. See Squam Lake Working Paper, supra note 
 
63, at 3. 
 81. Id.; see also Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65, at 38 (noting that 
multilateral netting of derivatives could promote liquidity); Turbeville, supra note 48, at 2 
(“There are certain netting benefits that require less cash margin than bi-lateral transactions 
that are subject to full collateralization of credit risks.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Turbeville, supra note 48, at 2 (“Clearinghouses manage credit risk using 
proven methods and systems which are uniform and virtually always superior to that which 
can be achieved by individual trading firms.”). 
 83. Id. at 1 (defining the credit risks in a derivatives trade as the risk that a replacement 
contract will be more expensive).  As previously discussed, the clearinghouse is legally 
obligated to the non-defaulting party to perform the terms of the original contract. See supra 
notes 63–65 and accompanying text.  Thus, if one party defaults, they must purchase a 
replacement so as to remain “balanced, with mirror image derivative transactions . . . at all 
times.” Turbeville, supra note 48, at 10. 
 84. Id. at 5.  This is because, unlike a real middleman who tries to sell his good at a 
premium, the price at which the clearinghouse purchases the financial instrument is 
(hopefully) the price at which it sells it.  Thus, if the price of the replacement contract is 
higher than the original price, the clearinghouse is experiencing a loss by having essentially 
sold the contract at a discount.   
 85. Id. at 1. 
 86. Id. at 5. 
 87. Id. at 9; see also Credit Default Swaps and Counterparty Risk, EUR. CENT. BANK 52–
53 (2009), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/
creditdefaultswapsandcounterpartyrisk2009en.pdf.   Clearinghouses also maintain a default 
fund to protect against these losses, with members contributing funds based on their 
transaction volume.  However, these default funds are generally inadequate to cover the sorts 
of systemic losses that occurred during the recent financial crisis.  As an example, the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange maintains a default fund of about $2 billion.  By contrast, the 
average daily change in its risk is $3 billion (that is, the additional amount needed to cover 
losses), and has at times reached in excess of $18.5 billion. Id.  
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Maintenance margins are called as the price of the swap increases, thus 
covering mark-to-market risk.  Wallace C. Turbeville describes the 
operation of maintenance margins as follows: 
As the price associated with a derivative moves so as to create clearing 
member credit risk to the clearinghouse, the amount of that risk has to be 
funded by the clearing member.  If the price subsequently moves in the 
opposite direction, maintenance margin is reduced and the clearing 
member receives a credit.  A clearing member is very likely to have some 
derivatives which move in its direction and some which move against it 
during any calculation period.  These movements are netted and the 
required maintenance margin payment (or credit) is the netted amount.88
Maintenance margins are typically calculated on a daily basis, although 
intraday margins may be called if necessary.
 
89  So long as the deposited 
margin could keep up with price changes, the clearinghouse would be fully 
protected against any default, and it would experience no losses.90
However, this ideal situation is unlikely to occur.  Maintenance margins 
are most likely based on the previous day’s prices, which are unlikely to 
have remained the same.
 
91  Moreover, markets may react adversely to the 
member’s default, further affecting prices.92  The risk that prices have risen 
since the last call for maintenance margin is known as illiquidity/volatility 
risk.93  Clearinghouses protect against it by requiring that parties post initial 
margin.94  As one might have inferred, initial margin is the clearinghouse’s 
estimate of price moves between the time when maintenance margin is 
posted and when the contract could hypothetically be replaced.95  In the 
end, because initial margin is calculated based upon historical data, the 
ability of a clearinghouse to hedge this residual risk is dictated by the 
accuracy of past observations in predicting future price changes.96
How does this system compare to that employed by dealers in the 
bilateral, OTC market?  In 1999, dealers with the most sophisticated 
systems collateralized only 10 to 30 percent of derivatives transactions.
 
97  A 
majority of those collateralization agreements provided for daily 
recalculation of exposure and collateral values, but as a practical matter 
“many call[ed] for collateral only weekly or monthly.”98
 
 88. Turbeville, supra note 
  Although 
practices changed significantly over the following decade, still only 63 
48, at 9. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 8.  This assumption is addressed at greater length in Part III. 
 91. Id. at 10. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 11. 
 97. Counterparty Risk Management, supra note 65, at 22. 
 98. Id. at 23.  The report noted that collateral calls “add to [dealers’] legal and 
operational risks.” Id.  In other words, it was burdensome to make and process these calls, 
and dealers were not always sure of the enforceability of terms providing for collateral calls, 
particularly in foreign jurisdictions and where the counterparty had entered bankruptcy. 
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percent of CDSs were collateralized by 2008.99  It is perhaps for this reason 
that the staunchest proponents of clearing have asserted that clearinghouses 
will ensure capital adequacy if managed properly.100
Finally, as evidenced by the legislative record, Congress believed that 
cleared transactions would impose fewer external costs on the financial 
system than if agreements were negotiated bilaterally.  In its report in 
support of the clearing mandate, the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Development noted that “[i]n the OTC market, margin 
requirements are set bilaterally and do not take account of the counterparty 
risk that each trade imposes on the rest of the system, thereby allowing 
systemically important exposures to build up without sufficient capital to 
mitigate associated risks.”
  This contention is 
revisited in Part III. 
101  Viral Acharya and Alberto Bisin specifically 
attribute this “counterparty risk externality”102 to the opacity of the OTC 
market, which leaves parties unable to properly price default risk without 
adequate information regarding their counterparty’s other positions.103  
Because a central clearing party records all of a party’s trades, they are 
much better placed to price that risk, and require efficient levels of 
collateral.104
II.  THE DESTABILIZING EFFECTS OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S 
EXEMPTIONS FOR SWAPS 
 
Thus far, this Comment has confined its inquiry to the basic uses of 
swaps in the financial system, and the accompanying risks of counterparty 
default.  As noted above, those risks materialized during the recent financial 
crisis to create massive losses and prompt a federal bailout.  This part 
introduces the following question:  how, if at all, were these losses affected 
by a change in the underlying bankruptcy rules to which swaps are subject?  
To answer this question, it reviews scholarship showing how these rules 
decreased incentives to monitor counterparty risk in the bilateral OTC 
market, thereby increasing overexposure to weak, systemically important 
institutions such as AIG.   
This part begins by exploring three of the bedrock principles of the 
Bankruptcy Code:  the automatic stay, limits on preferential transfers, and 
 
 99. Wallison, supra note 3, at 7. 
 100. See, e.g., Greenberger, supra note 47, at 105 (arguing that a “well capitalized and 
federally supervised” clearinghouse would act as “protection against a lack of 
creditworthiness of, and default by, OTC derivatives counterparties”). 
 101. S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. 2, at 33 (2010); see also ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 53 
(same). 
 102. Acharya and Bisin define this as “the effect that the default risk on one contract will 
be increased if the counterparty agrees to the same contract with another agent because the 
second contract increases the probability that the counterparty will be unable to perform on 
the first one.” See Viral Acharya & Alberto Bisin, Counterparty Risk Externality:  
Centralized Versus Over-the-Counter Markets 4 (June 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1573355. 
 103. See generally id. 
 104. See id. at 5. 
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the invalidation of ipso facto clauses.  The purpose of this discussion is to 
highlight the rules to which creditors are generally subject, so the reader can 
get a sense of precisely how and to what extent swap exemptions confer a 
privileged status.  Next, it addresses the substance of the exemptions 
themselves, with an emphasis on their practical significance for swap 
participants.  It then highlights some of the policy justifications for these 
provisions.  Finally, it shows how bankruptcy privileges promote financial 
instability by reducing incentives to monitor counterparty risk. 
A.  The Bankruptcy Code’s Normal Provisions 
Professor Thomas H. Jackson once wrote:  “The basic problem that 
bankruptcy law is designed to handle, both as a normative matter and as a 
positive matter, is that the system of individual creditor remedies may be 
bad for the creditors as a group when there are not enough assets to go 
around.”105  To illustrate Professor Jackson’s insight, consider a world in 
which no bankruptcy law existed.  If debtors remained solvent, every 
creditor would be paid in full.  However, when a debtor had liabilities in 
excess of assets, at least some creditors would by necessity experience 
some loss.  In such a regime, creditors would be paid on a first-come, first-
served basis.106  As a result, creditors acting out of rational self-interest 
would scramble to seize their share of the debtor’s limited assets before 
nothing was left.107
However, for a number of reasons, this process might not be desirable 
from the perspective of creditors as a class.  For example, the debtor’s 
business might be worth more in one piece than the sum of its individual 
assets.
 
108
 
 105. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10 (1986).  In 
this sense, bankruptcy law seeks to solve a “tragedy of the commons,” with the debtor’s 
estate being the common pool and individual creditors as the “users” of that resource. See id. 
at 10–12. 
  If creditors liquidated the business piece by piece, they would not 
be able to capture this additional value.  Bankruptcy law is therefore a 
 106. See id. at 9. 
 107. Id.  Professor Thomas H. Jackson analogizes this to concertgoers lining up to 
purchase tickets:  “the people first in line get the best seats; those at the end of the line may 
get nothing at all.” Id. 
 108. This attribute is known technically as “the surplus of a going-concern value over a 
liquidation value.” Id. at 14.  Professors Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison 
discuss this point further: 
[Going-concern value] exists, however, only if the firm’s assets are worth more to 
the firm than to outsiders.  This asymmetry arises when assets are customized to 
meet a firm’s idiosyncratic needs or the needs of firms in the same industry 
(examples include airplanes, railroad tracks, and brewery equipment). These 
specialized assets cannot be readily redeployed by other firms (if the assets are 
firm-specific) or by firms outside the industry (if they are industry-specific).  As a 
result, plant, equipment, and other specialized assets are relatively illiquid:  there 
are few buyers for the assets, and any potential buyers will value the assets 
significantly less than the seller does. 
Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code:  Why 
the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 111 (2005). 
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collectivized debt collection system that imposes rules on creditors so as to 
benefit this class in the aggregate.109
This section explores three of the Bankruptcy Code’s bedrock rules that 
further this principal goal.  In particular, it addresses the automatic stay,
 
110 
the avoidance of preferential transfers,111 and the invalidation of ipso facto 
clauses.112
1.  The Automatic Stay 
  However, as will be seen later in this Part, the Code exempts 
creditors to swap agreements from each of these three rules.  This privileges 
them vis-à-vis the debtor’s other creditors, and likely causes them to 
monitor counterparty risk less rigorously. 
The automatic stay, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362, acts as a “bar to all 
judicial and extrajudicial collection efforts against the debtor or the debtor’s 
property.”113  It comes into effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy 
petition.114  This rule serves an important function for creditor protection.  
As noted above, the debtor’s estate presents a common resource problem.  
Allowing creditors to line up and dismember the debtor piece by piece 
would in many situations be undesirable from the perspective of creditors as 
a class.115  The automatic stay directly prevents creditors from engaging in 
this sort of conduct.116
It is important to note that the automatic stay is also effective against 
secured creditors.
 
117  In other words, once the debtor files for bankruptcy, 
the automatic stay prevents the secured creditor from seizing its collateral.  
One might ask:  if secured creditors already have priority in certain assets of 
the debtor—as swap participants do once their counterparties post 
collateral118
 
 109. See JACKSON, supra note 
—then why can they not promptly proceed against those assets 
to satisfy their claims?  The answer lies in the fact that the collateral, 
although subject to a security interest, may be essential to the debtor’s 
105, at 14.  Professor Jackson notes that preserving “the 
aggregate value of the assets” is only the most “obvious reason” for a collectivized debt 
collection system; there are other significant benefits as well. Id.  For example, creditors may 
prefer a guaranteed collection, even at a deficiency, rather than risk losing the race and 
getting paid nothing at all. See id. at 15.  Moreover, such races for the debtor’s assets can be 
wasteful in and of themselves. See id. at 16. 
 110. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). 
 111. See id. § 547(b). 
 112. See id. § 365(e)(1). 
 113. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 1548. 
 114. See § 362(a) (noting that the petition itself “operates as a stay”); 3 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.LH[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.). 
 115. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 116. The legislative history of the automatic stay confirms this as an underlying policy 
justification:  “Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies 
against the debtor’s property.  Those who acted first would obtain payment of their claims in 
preference to and to the detriment of other creditors.”  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297.  
 117. § 362(a)(5) (stating that the stay is applicable to “any act to create, perfect, or 
enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim 
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title”). 
 118. See Lubben, supra note 21, at 126. 
1508 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
operations and thus its ability to reorganize.  In other words, proceeding 
against the collateral creates an externality:  “Removal of collateral benefits 
the secured creditor but harms other creditors by destroying firm value.”119  
Absent the automatic stay, the secured creditor would ignore this external 
cost and proceed against the collateral anyway.120
2.  Avoidance of Preferential Transfers 
  Therefore, the automatic 
stay as applied to secured creditors still benefits creditors as a class. 
Preferential transfers are payments made by an insolvent debtor to or for 
the benefit of a creditor prior to bankruptcy, enabling that creditor to 
receive more than it would have in the bankruptcy proceeding.121  Section 
547(b) of the Code gives the trustee in bankruptcy the power to avoid such 
transfers.122  Note that the provision makes no reference to the creditor’s or 
debtor’s intent—only the transaction’s effect upon other creditors is 
significant.123
The effect of a preferential payment is, of course, to benefit one 
particular creditor at the expense of the debtor’s other creditors.  Professor 
Jackson notes that, consequently, a preferential payment 
 
would not be in the collective interest of the creditors because it 
reintroduces the common pool problem.  Preference law is best viewed as 
a solution to this replication of the common pool problem that results 
 
 119. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108, at 107. 
 120. See id. at 17–18.  Professor Jackson and Professor Douglas G. Baird further 
elaborate on this point: 
Individual diverse owners have a particular incentive to act against the collective 
interest in cases where, under nonbankruptcy law, some owners are entitled to be 
paid before others and where the available assets are insufficient to satisfy all those 
with rights to them. A fully secured creditor, for example, has the right to be paid 
before more junior creditors receive anything.  Like any other person assured of 
full payment if the business were to stop, he will tend to favor an immediate 
liquidation, even in circumstances in which a sole owner would keep the assets 
together. As a senior debtholder he has nothing to gain from waiting and 
attempting to keep the firm intact, but he can do worse if the firm continues and its 
fortunes decline—a possibility that always exists in an uncertain world, whether 
the firm is solvent or insolvent, in or out of bankruptcy. 
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of 
Diverse Ownership Interests:  A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in 
Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97, 106–07 (1984). 
 121. § 547(b) defines as preferential  
any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property— 
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed 
by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor was 
insolvent; (4) made . . . on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the 
petition . . . (5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would 
receive if—(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had 
not been made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent 
provided by the provisions of this title.  
§ 547(b). 
 122. Id. 
 123. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 547.03; see also Kenan v. Fort Worth 
Pipe Co., 792 F.2d 125, 127 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that the basis for exceptions to § 547(b) 
is that such instances are not “deemed harmful to the debtor’s estate”). 
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from strategic planning in the prebankruptcy period.  Preference law, 
therefore, is essentially a transitional rule designed to prevent individual 
creditors from opting out of the collective proceeding once that event 
becomes likely.  It is part of the attempt to ameliorate the effects of a 
common pool problem that justifies a collective proceeding in the first 
place.124
It is therefore necessary to keep bankruptcy a system of collectivized debt 
collection.  Without it, creditors would be able to get in line ahead of others, 
leaving nothing for those late in the game. 
 
3.  Prohibition of Ipso Facto Clauses 
An ipso facto clause stipulates the contractual effect of a party entering 
into bankruptcy.125  These clauses typically allow a party to terminate a 
contract when its counterparty files for bankruptcy.126  In re Clerc 
Chemical Corp.127 provides a classic example of an ipso facto clause, as 
well as courts’ hesitancy to enforce such clauses even before the 
Bankruptcy Code was enacted.  In Clerc Chemical, Reilly Tar & Chemical 
Corporation leased property to Frederick D. Loeb.128
If the Lessee shall be adjudicated a bankrupt, file a voluntary petition in 
bankruptcy, make a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, or if a 
receiver of its properties and assets shall be appointed, then and in that 
event the Lessor shall have the option to terminate this lease . . . .
  The lease contained 
an ipso facto clause, providing: 
129
Thereafter, Loeb assigned the lease to Clerc Chemical, a corporation he had 
formed.
 
130  Two years later Clerc Chemical filed a bankruptcy petition, and 
Reilly Tar & Chemical exercised its option to terminate the lease.131
Notwithstanding a clause that bound the assignee to the “terms, 
covenants, conditions and agreements” of the original lease, and the fact the 
assignee was the original lessee’s own corporation, the court held that the 
ipso facto clause was not binding against Clerc Chemical.
 
132  The court 
began by noting that “[f]orfeitures are not favored either at law or in 
equity,” and that “a provision for a forfeiture in a lease will be construed 
strictly in favor of the tenant.”133
 
 124. JACKSON, supra note 
  It then proceeded to base its holding on 
the fact that there were no express words binding the assignee to the ipso 
facto clause. 
105, at 125. 
 125. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 905 (defining an ipso facto clause 
as a “contract clause that specifies the consequences of a party’s bankruptcy”). 
 126. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 365.08[1]. 
 127. 52 F. Supp. 109 (D.N.J. 1943). 
 128. See id. at 109. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. at 109–10. 
 133. Id. at 110 (quoting In re Larkey, 214 F. 867, 870 (D.N.J. 1914)).  A forfeiture clause 
is a “contractual provision stating that, under certain circumstances, one party must forfeit 
something to the other.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 26, at 722. 
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Clerc Chemical aptly demonstrates courts’ distaste for enforcing ipso 
facto clauses because of their potential to cause forfeitures.  Additionally, 
courts failed to enforce these clauses “in order to allow the trustee to make 
the most of any valuable asset in the estate.”134
Prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, such clauses 
were generally enforceable.
  Although Clerc Chemical 
did not explicitly invoke this latter justification, the facts of the case 
illustrate the underlying policy:  if Clerc Chemical was permitted to stay on 
the property, they could have continued to do business and generated 
revenue to satisfy creditors’ claims.  With a forfeiture, it would have been 
entirely deprived of this opportunity. 
135  The Reform Act reversed this rule and 
codified cases like Clerc Chemical.136  Stated simply, contractual 
provisions that provide for modification or termination of the contract in the 
event of insolvency,137 bankruptcy,138 or the appointment of a receiver or 
custodian139
B.  Provisions Exempting Derivatives 
 are void. 
When the Bankruptcy Code was first enacted in 1978, it accorded special 
status to a narrow class of financial transactions and actors.140  Over the 
next twenty-five years, Congress greatly expanded both the scope and 
number of these exemptions from the Code’s ordinary provisions, 
eventually reaching swap agreements.141  As noted above, the automatic 
stay, avoidance of preferential transfers, and the invalidation of ipso facto 
clauses operate by limiting the enforceability of certain contractual 
provisions when the debtor enters bankruptcy.  The Code privileges swaps 
by exempting them from these limitations on creditor conduct.142  Stated 
conversely, it accords these creditors much more freedom to contractually 
protect themselves from a debtor’s insolvency.143
 
 134. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 
  Below is an overview of 
114, ¶ 365.08; see also Yates Dev., Inc. v. 
Old Kings Interchange, Inc., 241 B.R. 247, 253 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (“These termination 
clauses are invalidated because they deprive the Chapter 11 estate of valuable property 
rights, such as the opportunity to receive the benefits of a contract, at the very time the 
debtor and the estate may need these rights the most in order to further rehabilitation 
efforts.”). 
 135. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 365.08. 
 136. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (2006). 
 137. See § 365(e)(1)(A). 
 138. See § 365(e)(1)(B). 
 139. See § 365(e)(1)(C). 
 140. See 11 U.S.C. § 764(c) (Supp. II 1979). 
 141. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108, at 96. 
 142. Roe, supra note 8, at 548 (“Bankruptcy sticklers may object to calling these priority 
provisions and they are formally correct . . . .  The derivatives and repo benefits operate by 
exempting the bankrupt’s derivatives- and repo-holding creditors from baseline 
rules . . . insulating them from typical creditor liability rules . . . and giving them more 
rights.”). 
 143. See Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New 
Bankruptcy Code:  Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 641, 645 (2005) (“These limits on counterparty rights, however, 
do not apply when the underlying contract is a financial contract and the counterparty is a 
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the relevant statutory provisions, and their significance for creditors.  As 
will be seen, swap privileges essentially fall into three categories:  rights to 
seize collateral, rights to setoff, and the avoidance of liability for 
preferential transfers. 
Almost all swap agreements provide that the commencement of a 
bankruptcy proceeding constitutes an event of default, giving rise to certain 
remedial rights.144  Of these, the Code protects the rights to liquidate, 
terminate, and accelerate the agreement, and the right to offset and net 
claims.145  Furthermore, 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17) creates an exception to the 
automatic stay for exercise of contractual rights arising out of security and 
netting agreements.146
To illustrate, consider first secured creditor rights.  As discussed 
previously in Part I.C, parties to swap agreements often make collateral 
calls in an effort to secure their counterparty’s obligations, and that doing so 
creates a secured claim.
  Taken together, these provisions give parties to 
swap agreements a material advantage over the debtor's other creditors in 
the event of insolvency, increasing both the amount and timeliness of their 
recovery. 
147  Normally, the automatic stay would prevent a 
secured creditor from foreclosing against its collateral once the debtor 
enters bankruptcy.148  Sections 560 and 362(17) are exceptions to this rule, 
specifically providing that the rights of secured creditors to swap 
agreements are unaffected by the filing of a petition.149  Because initiating a 
bankruptcy proceeding almost always constitutes an event of default in a 
swap agreement, the practical consequence is that the creditor can terminate 
an unfavorable contract with the debtor and immediately seize the posted 
collateral.150
Collier on Bankruptcy describes the right to setoff as follows: 
 
Setoff is a right of equitable origin designed to facilitate the adjustment of 
mutual obligations.  Its central premise is an ancient one well-grounded in 
practical logic:  If A is indebted to B, and B is likewise indebted to A, it 
 
‘protected party.’  Protected parties enjoy the same rights in bankruptcy as they do outside.” 
(emphasis added)); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 560.04[2] (noting 
that termination and acceleration rights are furnished not by the Code itself, but by “a written 
agreement or other document, such as a customer agreement, master agreement or the terms 
and conditions printed on a confirmation of the transaction”). 
 144. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 560.04. 
 145. See 11 U.S.C. § 560 (2006); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, 
¶ 560.04 . 
 146. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17); see also id. § 362(b)(27) (giving similar privileges to “a 
master netting agreement participant”); id. § 362(o) (providing that these rights may not be 
stayed by “any order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this title.”).  
Collier on Bankruptcy explains the inclusion of § 362(o) as follows:  “This provision was 
added by the 2005 Act to make clear that the protections afforded by section 362(b)(17) . . . 
cannot be circumvented by an injunction issued pursuant to section 105(a).”  5 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 560.05 n.7. 
 147. See Lubben, supra note 21, at 126. 
 148. See generally supra Part II.A. 
 149. See §§ 362(b)(17), 560. 
 150. See Roe, supra note 8, at 548. 
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makes sense simply to apply one debt in satisfaction of the other rather 
than require A and B to satisfy their mutual liabilities separately.151
Such is commonly used by swap participants to limit credit exposure in the 
form of bilateral netting, as noted in Part I.C.  These rights are important to 
creditors for several reasons.  First, setoff allows the creditor to avoid 
handing money over to the debtor that it otherwise would.  Second, setoff 
effectively means that the creditor’s claim is secured by its own debt:  the 
creditor will be paid first out of the debtor’s claim on it, up to the amount of 
that claim.
 
152  Thus, this priority enables it to recover more than the 
debtor’s other creditors.153
Finally, in addition to the setoff and secured creditor rights discussed 
above, the Code also exempts parties to swap agreements from the 
avoidance of preferential transfers.
 
154  Consequently, the creditor can keep 
payments—and in particular, transfers of collateral—which the trustee 
could have otherwise voided if made 90 days prior to the filing of a 
petition.155
C.  Justifications for the Code’s Exemptions for Swaps 
 
As Parts II.A–B have shown, the rules applicable to swaps deviate 
substantially from the Bankruptcy Code’s normal provisions.  These 
exemptions privilege one class of creditors to the eventual detriment of 
others.  What justifications underlie such differential treatment?  Congress 
essentially had two motives:  the prevention of the debtor unfairly “cherry-
picking” favorable contracts, and the promotion of financial stability.  Each 
of these is discussed below.  In addition, this section will address several 
criticisms of this latter argument, and note an alternative justification which 
has been proposed by scholars.   
 One of Congress’s concerns was that if a creditor could not terminate and 
setoff multiple agreements, the debtor could unfairly choose which 
executory contracts156
 
 151. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 
 to perform and which to terminate pursuant to its 
114, ¶ 553.01. 
 152. See id. ¶ 553.02 (“Indeed, a right of setoff has been described as ‘security of the 
most perfect kind’ precisely because the creditor holds the means of satisfying its claim 
through the extinguishment of its own debt.” (quoting Boston Ins. Co. v. Nogg, 362 F.2d 
111, 114 (2d Cir. 1966))). 
 153. See id. 
 154. See § 546(g); see also § 546(j) (granting similar privileges to transfers made 
pursuant to a master netting agreement). Constructively fraudulent transfers, otherwise 
avoidable pursuant to § 548(a)(1)(B), are also exempted. See § 546(g).  Thus, the only 
payments not exempted are those made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or 
such obligation was incurred, indebted.” See § 548(a)(1)(A).   
 155. See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 114, ¶ 546.08. 
 156. Executory contracts are those “under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and 
the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete 
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.” 
Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy:  Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 
(1973). 
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avoidance powers in § 365.157  The specific inequity arises out of the fact 
that the trustee could wait to see how the market performed before choosing 
whether to accept or reject a contract.  Collier on Bankruptcy explains the 
concern that permitting the trustee to “play the markets with perfect 
hindsight in determining whether to assume or reject swap agreements 
seems to go far beyond the normal liquidation and reorganization policies 
of the Bankruptcy Code, and arguably amounts to affording the estate a 
windfall at the expense of other participants in the market.”158
However, by far the most significant concern was thought to be the 
promotion of stability in financial markets.
 
159  Senator Grassley, when 
arguing for extension of these privileges to swap agreements, summarized 
the unifying purpose of these exemptions:  “This amendment would go a 
long way toward ensuring that the failure of a participant will not unduly 
disrupt an extremely important financial market.  The bill follows an 
approach that . . . is to minimize risk and dislocation to financial markets 
after a bankruptcy.”160
The House Report stated that “[t]he prompt liquidation of an insolvent’s 
position is generally desirable to minimize the potentially massive losses 
and chain reaction of insolvencies that could occur if the market were to 
move sharply in the wrong direction.”
  But how exactly could these provisions promote 
financial stability? 
161
 
 157. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-484, at 3 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 223, 225 
(“Concerns have been raised that under current bankruptcy law, termination and setoff of a 
swap agreement would be automatically stayed when one of the parties files a bankruptcy 
petition, whereupon the trustee, after indefinitely postponing termination of the swap 
agreement, could refuse setoff and unfairly “cherry pick” only the portions of the agreement 
advantageous to the debtor, while rejecting the portions unfavorable to the debtor.”). 
  In the event of a large 
institution’s bankruptcy, the automatic stay would render its counterparties’ 
 158. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 118, ¶ 560.01 n.4. 
 159. In fact, Congress and many commentators believed that cherrypicking might by 
itself destabilize the market. See 136 Cong. Rec. S7413, 7536 (June 6, 1990) (statement of 
Sen. Grassley) (“[T]here is the risk that a defaulting party or a trustee in bankruptcy could 
assume favorable swap transactions and reject unfavorable ones—so-called cherry picking—
even though the swap contract calls for liquidation of these obligations by netting.  The 
exposure created by these risks takes on special significance in a volatile market.”); 
Morrison & Riegel, supra note 143, at 642 (“Losses from indefinite exposure to market 
movements and from cherrypicking could produce financial distress in the counterparty 
itself, forcing it to default on its own contracts with other parties. As one distressed party 
infects another, a domino effect could ensue, undermining the entire financial market.”). 
 160. 136 Cong. Rec. at 7536.  Senator Grassley noted in passing that swaps are a 
particularly valuable financial instrument to thrift organizations, who were at the time 
experiencing “severe financial pressure.” Id.  Thus, one can gather that the Savings and Loan 
Crisis (1986–95) was a motivating factor for passage of this legislation. Timothy Curry & 
Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis:  Truth and Consequences, FDIC 
BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 26, 27,  available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/
banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf.  The value of swaps to a thrift organization arises out of 
the fact that it typically has assets with fixed rates of return (i.e. mortgages) and liabilities 
with variable interest rates. See 136 Cong. Rec. at 7536.  This makes it particularly 
vulnerable to spikes in interest rates. See id.  As noted above, interest rate swaps would 
allow them to hedge against this risk by “swapping” their variable interest rate liabilities for 
fixed rate liabilities. 
 161. H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 585. 
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claims illiquid, thus increasing the chance that they would themselves 
become unable to meet liabilities.  Allowing creditors to immediately seize 
collateral would theoretically solve this problem.162  Moreover, a 
subsequent House Report clarified the need to protect this particular class of 
creditors:  “Because financial markets can change significantly in a matter 
of days, or even hours, a non-bankrupt party to ongoing securities and other 
financial transactions could face heavy losses unless the transactions are 
[resolved] promptly and with finality.”163
Professors Franklin R. Edwards and Edward R. Morrison point to a 
number of deficiencies in these arguments.  They note that swap 
participants are no more likely to become insolvent than any of the debtor’s 
other creditors.
  Thus, the reasoning was that 
financial markets merited special treatment because of their highly volatile 
nature. 
164  Thus, Congress’s “volatility of financial markets” 
reasoning is too broad to adequately explain why certain creditors are 
privileged and others are not.  They concede that a “chain of insolvencies” 
might be possible if creditors had failed to properly manage risk vis-à-vis 
the debtor.165  But they respond that “the solution to this failure is better 
risk management by counterparties, not amendments to the Bankruptcy 
Code exempting derivatives counterparties from its automatic stay 
provisions.  Or . . . the answer should be either better supervision or a 
regulatory structure that increases incentives to manage counterparty risk 
more effectively.”166  They also argue that these exemptions could 
exacerbate the situation by causing effects akin to a bank run.167  In the end, 
they seem to suggest that, although ostensibly not misguided, these 
provisions rest on tenuous justifications and should “worry” those members 
of Congress who unwaveringly subscribe to the systemic risk argument.168
D.  The Potential for Exemptions to Magnify Losses 
 
Despite Congress’s best intentions in enacting these exemptions, scholars 
have noted a number of unintended effects.169  This Comment focuses on 
Professor Mark J. Roe’s research showing that privileged status induces less 
rigorous market discipline, thereby magnifying the scale of a financial 
crisis.170
 
 162. Cf. Morrison & Riegel, supra note 
  Roe essentially argues that because of these privileges, swap 
participants are less exposed to loss in the event of default.  Consequently, 
143, at 642 (“Without these safe harbors, markets 
might suffer serious shocks—perhaps even a systemic liquidity crisis, causing markets to 
collapse—when debtors enter bankruptcy.  Counterparties to financial contracts would find 
themselves subject to the automatic stay for extended periods.  They would be unable to 
liquidate volatile contracts and thereby limit their exposure to market movements.”). 
 163. H.R. REP. NO. 101-484, at 2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 223, 224. 
 164. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108, at 101–02. 
 165. See id. at 102–03. 
 166. Id. at 103. 
 167. See id. at 101. 
 168. See id. at 122. 
 169. See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 21; Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108. 
 170. See generally Roe, supra note 8. 
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they have less incentive to rigorously monitor their counterparty’s 
creditworthiness and take steps to protect themselves when they perceive 
any increase in the risk of default.171
How exactly do reduced incentives to monitor counterparty risk magnify 
losses in a financial crisis?  Roe argues that these privileges 
  This in turn gives weak counterparties 
access to inexpensive financing, increasing the magnitude of an eventual 
failure.   
induc[e] stronger players to accept a higher, perhaps imprudently higher, 
level of derivatives and repo financing with weak counterparties. If they 
bore more risk of counterparty failure, they might demand better-
capitalized counterparties. Or they would demand better counterparty 
portfolio information, so that they could better price that risk.  They 
would charge the risky counterparty more and the sound one less. The 
weak counterparty would be incentivized to become financially stronger 
(so as to be charged less) and, at least to the extent prices rose, the parties 
would do less derivatives and repo business. The Code’s superpriorities 
thereby undermine market discipline.172
Thus, the Code’s privileges result in the debtor’s and creditor’s
 
173 overuse 
of these particular instruments, without sufficient capital backing.174  This 
overexposure would have been lessened if creditors were incentivized to 
“contain the risk of counterparty failure.”175  In the end, it was AIG, Bear 
Stearns, and Lehman Brothers’ large exposures to instruments protected by 
the Code, and lack of necessary capital reserves, which precipitated their 
collapses.176
Morrison and Edwards find a related effect on firms’ incentive structure.  
They argue that, because derivatives can be used as a proxy for a loan, these 
exemptions may incentivize creditors to shift toward using swaps instead of 
loans as a financing device.  This would occur when the debtor’s 
creditworthiness declines, because the benefits of priority status start to 
outweigh the increased transaction costs.
 
177
 
 171. Id. at 555. 
  Morrison and Edwards note 
that this shift is simply a form of rent-seeking—the act of increasing profits 
 172. Id. 
 173. Creditors could face insolvency if their exposure is so high that there is not enough 
collateral to cover their losses in the event of a default.  This would have been precisely the 
case if the federal government had not stepped in to bail out AIG. See Wallison, supra note 
3, at 7. 
 174. See Roe, supra note 8, at 555. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See generally id. at 550–54. 
 177. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108, at 120. 
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without actually producing any additional wealth178:  creditors with these 
privileges recover more, leaving less for those who must wait their turn.179
Both Roe and Morrison and Edwards note that these parties do better in 
the event of counterparty insolvency, and both address different effects of 
this increased recovery on incentives.  Roe focuses primarily on how swap 
privileges cause slackened efforts to contain counterparty risk, because 
creditors are essentially concerned with collateral rather than firm value.  
By contrast, Edwards and Morrison posit that increased riskiness can itself 
induce greater reliance on derivatives.  Taken together, the two arguments 
suggest that a self-perpetuating process occurs whereby derivatives induce 
more precarious positions, and these more precarious positions in turn mean 
that creditors prefer to deal with the debtor only when protected by the 
Code’s privileges.
 
180  Perhaps this theory could help to explain the 
exponential rise of derivatives in recent years, as well as some of the more 
outrageous positions taken prior to the crisis.181
Before continuing, it is worth noting one of the counterarguments to 
Roe’s position.  Because the debtor’s other creditors are subject to the 
normal rules of bankruptcy, they recover less as a result of these privileges.  
Therefore, they should more diligently monitor that counterparty risk and 
contain losses in the event of default.
 
182  In particular, they should increase 
the cost of credit, or refuse to lend unless their counterparty acquired a 
sounder capital structure.183  Both of these measures would make the 
financial system more stable.184  However, these third parties lack either the 
incentives or the capacity to do so.185
Notwithstanding the potential destabilizing effects of the Code’s 
exemptions for derivatives contracts, these exemptions are not addressed in 
  Consequently, the Code’s 
exemptions give priority to those best positioned to monitor counterparty 
risk. 
 
 178. Gordon Tullock, The Fundamentals of Rent-Seeking, 1 LOCKE LUMINARY NO. 2  
(1998), available at http://www.thelockeinstitute.org/journals/luminary_v1_n2_p2.html 
(noting that, from an efficiency perspective, the essential problem with rent-seeking is that 
the resources entities expend in seeking such rents constitutes waste).  The Economist 
describes rent-seeking in more accessible terms:  “Cutting yourself a bigger slice of the cake 
rather than making the cake bigger.” Economics A-Z, ECONOMIST 
http://www.economist.com/economics-a-to-z/r#node-21529810 (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). 
 179. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 108, at 121.  Professors Morrison and Edwards 
further note that exemptions may eventually “alter the debt structure of firms towards a 
greater reliance on derivatives by favoring derivatives counterparties over other creditors.”  
Id. 
 180. Roe also notes this potential for a “self-reinforcing engine” to occur.  Roe, supra 
note 8, at 559. 
 181. See id. at 556.  For an example of one such transaction, see infra note 200. 
 182. See Roe, supra note 8, at 556. 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. at 555. 
 185. See id. Roe analyzed the risk-monitoring capabilities of four creditor categories:  
commercial paper holders, insurance premium payers, depositors, and the United States 
government, who becomes a creditor in the event of a bailout. See id. at 557–59.  He 
concluded that none of these creditors are particularly capable of demanding sounder 
counter-parties ex ante. 
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Dodd-Frank, nor have they garnered much attention amongst reformers 
more generally.  Moreover, although investors may now be acutely aware 
of derivatives’ riskiness, the exemptions still constitute remaining structural 
flaws in the ways those risks are assessed.  Thus, it is of the utmost 
importance that actions be taken to address the unintended effects of the 
Code’s privileged status provisions, whether by outright repeal or 
otherwise. 
At the end of his article, Roe briefly addresses the potential impact of the 
clearing mandate.186  Specifically, he states that “it’s unclear whether the 
exchange would itself be properly incentivized to handle counterparty 
risk.”187  Part III addresses precisely this issue.  This is a particularly 
relevant inquiry because, with the passage of Dodd-Frank, there is no 
longer the same political expediency so necessary to effectuate financial 
reform.188
III.  THE POTENTIAL FOR DODD-FRANK’S CLEARINGHOUSE MANDATE 
TO RESTORE STABILITY TO THE SWAP MARKET 
  Thus, the clearing mandate may be the best opportunity to 
bolster market discipline, and prevent another crisis event. 
The questions addressed by this part include whether the clearinghouse 
structure could provide greater incentives to monitor counterparty risk, and 
if so, what regulatory controls might be necessary to ensure that limits on 
losses are in fact put into place.  These inquiries are essential because, as 
argued below, clearinghouses’ traditional risk management tools are not 
likely to prevent a systemic event.  Thus, clearinghouses are in danger of 
falling victim to the same unintended effects of the Bankruptcy Code that 
magnified losses in the recent financial crisis.  Nonetheless, this part argues 
that a clearinghouse would theoretically have greater incentives to monitor 
counterparty risk.  Finally, it addresses some of the steps regulators should 
take to ensure that clearinghouses are exercising greater market discipline.   
A.  Traditional Clearinghouse Risk Management Devices Are Not Likely 
Capable of Preventing Another Systemic Event 
A clearinghouse’s primary risk management devices likely would not 
have prevented the systemic losses experienced during the recent financial 
crisis.  The purpose of margining is to ensure an amount of collateral is 
called sufficient to cover any losses from replacement of the contract on the 
open market.189
 
 186. See Roe, supra note 8, at 586–87. 
  Stated simply, so long as margining can keep up with the 
costs of replacing the trade, then the clearinghouse is adequately protected 
 187. Id. 
 188. The absence of a political constituency for reform owes to the fact that policymakers 
suffer from powerful reputational disincentives to enact regulatory reforms.  Consequently, 
they will only do so if continued regulatory forbearance is so ostensibly misguided as to 
harm their political careers. See EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS:  HOW DID 
IT HAPPEN? 68 (1989) (documenting this phenomenon in the context of the Savings and 
Loan Crisis). 
 189. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
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from any losses arising out of counterparty default.  If it does not, then the 
clearinghouse itself faces insolvency. 
It seems unlikely that a clearinghouse would be able to make adequate 
collateral calls if it were highly exposed to a systemically important 
institution.  Consider the extraordinary speed and volume of collateral calls 
made against AIG during the recent financial crisis: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
190
 
   
AIG simply had insufficient capital reserves to meet collateral calls on its 
CDS positions as they rapidly came due.  Conceptually, this means that 
AIG was unable to post the amount of collateral which its counterparties 
deemed necessary to protect themselves from its default.  The simple 
feature of trades being executed through a centralized clearing party, rather 
than bilaterally, does not alter this fundamental problem of capital 
inadequacy.  True, a clearinghouse’s collateral calls would have been more 
systematic and thorough, but that does not change the fact that deals are 
largely collateralized as the market worsens, not ex ante.  Moreover, a 
clearinghouse’s use of initial margins is unlikely to have made much of a 
difference either:  it seems entirely unrealistic that it could accurately 
 
 190. See Paul Kiel, AIG’s Spiral Downward:  A Timeline, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2008), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/article-aigs-downward-spiral-1114.  A similar trend 
occurred in CDS spreads. See, e.g., Hayne Leland, Structural Models and the Credit Crisis 
(July 8, 2009), http://haas.berkeley.edu/groups/finance/CHINA7.pdf.  Thus to the extent that 
a clearinghouse would have based its collateral calls on mark-to-market risk instead of credit 
rating downgrades, AIG still would have been unlikely to meet those collateral calls. 
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predict the amount of collateral it would need to replace agreements during 
a crisis event.  In other words, the illiquidity/volatility risk on which initial 
margins are based would be too difficult to calculate.  Thus, if a 
clearinghouse was already overexposed to a systemically important 
institution, it is highly unlikely that its system of margining could have 
adequately protected it from default.   
One might argue that multilateral netting would simultaneously limit 
credit exposure and drastically reduce the need for collateral.  This would 
soften the blow of a counterparty’s failure on the clearinghouse and its 
members.  To illustrate, they might point to the fact that during Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy proceedings, its counterparties presented $400 billion 
in CDSs for settlement, but after netting, only $6 billion actually “changed 
hands.”191  Although this argument seems powerful, the actual value of 
multilateral netting is highly uncertain.192  In particular, commentators note 
that a large number of clearinghouses could substantially dampen its 
benefits.193
What about the contention that clearinghouses would have prevented the 
problem of overexposure ex ante by requiring higher initial margin?  In its 
defense of the clearing mandate, the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs cited the IMF for the proposition that “[p]utting 
nearly all derivatives through clearinghouses, with tough margin rules, 
could do away with most of the under-collateralization.”
   
194
This concern over incentives is far from academic.  Some have warned 
that the market for clearing might become too competitive, with 
clearinghouses consequently lowering membership eligibility standards in 
order to capture greater market share.  Wallace C. Turbeville notes that 
“[c]ompetition among clearinghouses is intense.  Their revenues are driven 
by volume of contracts cleared.  There is a strong incentive to exceed the 
boundaries of prudent risk management in order to succeed against the 
competitors.”
  Given the 
extraordinary shortage of collateral experienced during the recent financial 
crisis, this contention seems appealing.  However, it dodges the 
fundamental issue of whether a clearinghouse is better incentivized to hedge 
against counterparty risk.  After all, tougher collateral requirements in the 
bilateral market, induced by rigorous market discipline, also could have 
solved the under-collateralization problem.   
195
 
 191. ACHARYA ET AL., supra note 
  Thus, clearinghouses might eschew higher collateral 
53.  In addition, clearinghouse failures have proven 
themselves to be very rare occurrences. See Ripatti, supra note 61, at 16–20.  Recent 
examples include the Caisse de Liquidation in 1973, the Kuala Lumpur Commodity Clearing 
House in 1983, and the Hong Kong Futures Guarantee Corporation in 1987. Id. at 24.  This 
may not be much comfort, though, given that the recent financial crisis could itself be 
described as an extraordinary event. 
 192. See Mark Roe, Derivatives Clearinghouses Are No Magic Bullet, WALL ST. J., May 
6, 2010, at A19. 
 193. See, e.g., Squam Lake Working Paper, supra note 63, at 4. 
 194. S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. 2, at 31 (2010). 
 195. Turbeville, supra note 48, at 12; see also Squam Lake Working Paper, supra note 
63, at 3–4 (“In the fight for market share, they may compete by lowering their operating 
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requirements in pursuit of greater revenue, just like participants in the 
bilateral market.  The crucial question is precisely why we should entrust 
clearinghouses, instead of the bilateral market, with the decision-making 
power over collateralization; it is too tenuous to assert categorically that 
clearinghouses would have required more collateral a priori.   
B.  Because a Clearinghouse Would Bear More Risk of Default, It Would 
Be Better Incentivized to Monitor Counterparty Risk 
As the above analysis shows, there is strong reason to doubt that a 
clearinghouse’s risk management tools would adequately limit its own 
losses during a systemic event, at least of the type experienced in 2008.   
Thus, the essential problem explored in Part II.D, and as articulated by Roe, 
remains:  the Code reduces incentives to monitor counterparty risk by 
privileging this class of creditors.  The only difference is that it is now a 
clearinghouse, rather than its individual member firms, which might fail to 
limit losses of counterparty default ex ante as a result of privileged status.  
But are there reasons to believe that a clearinghouse might actually be more 
incentivized to do so? 
Theoretically, yes.  There are several possible reasons.  The first relates 
to the fact that a clearinghouse would bear greater losses from a 
counterparty’s default.196
However, as noted in Part I.C., a clearing structure essentially 
concentrates counterparty risk in the clearinghouse.  As a result, it would 
bear greater losses in the event of a large institution’s default, and more 
importantly, those losses would appear less remote:  it would not be 
diversified (especially where it was only clearing a limited class of 
derivatives), and presumably its monitoring activities would be much more 
focused on a particular class of instruments.
  Without a clearinghouse, risks are spread across 
different firms, who have presumably diversified against them to some 
degree.  Moreover, the possibility of uncollateralized losses may appear too 
remote to merit much attention, especially where that counterparty has a 
high credit rating, and the prevailing market attitude at the time is one of 
optimism. 
197
 
standards, demanding less collateral from their customers, and requiring less capital from 
their members.”). 
  In other words, because 
clearinghouses bear greater losses from default, it appears quite plausible 
that the clearing structure would reduce the external risks that transactions 
impose on the financial system.  Consequently, the clearinghouse would be 
better incentivized to price risk accurately. 
 196. The countervailing concern is that, in this way, the clearing mandate actually creates 
institutions that are too big to fail. See Roe, supra note 192. 
 197. But see S. REP. NO. 111-176, pt. 11, at 241 (2010) (suggesting that “specialized 
dealers in bilateral markets can monitor and manage the risks of complex, illiquid derivatives 
contracts and complex, opaque counterparties more effectively than all-purpose 
clearinghouses that are designed to clear standardized liquid contracts among clearing 
members”). 
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Second, bankruptcy privileges have provided so great a sense of security 
that firms entirely ignored the potential for collateral calls to bring down 
counterparties with large, correlated derivatives positions.  Although one 
might instead attribute this “rational ignorance” to the highly opaque nature 
of the OTC market,198 one could just as easily argue that this observed lack 
of transparency was itself caused, at least in part, by the Code’s 
exemptions:  as Roe notes, if parties had borne more risk, they would have 
demanded more information about their counterparties’ holdings.199  At the 
very least, it seems as if the Code’s privileges combined with the highly 
opaque nature of the OTC derivatives market to leave parties completely 
blinded to the actual risk of loss from a counterparty’s default.  Perhaps this 
could explain the logic behind some of the more baffling positions, such as 
where VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Limited issued $20 million 
in CDO protection to Wachovia and Citibank, or in other words, 40 percent 
of the fund’s capital on these two contracts alone.200
Regardless of its causes, this sense of security would have been entirely 
irrational for a clearinghouse.  Because of its system of margining, one 
large swing in the market could result in crippling liability for its 
counterparty on the mark-to-market risk of its swap portfolio.
 
201
Third, an individual firm may very well recognize the risk that its 
counterparty is too thinly capitalized to meet all of its collateral calls.  
However, the firm might also believe that it could contractually protect 
itself from being too late in line.  As previously noted, the swap 
participant’s game is essentially to call for collateral before the counterparty 
defaults.
  In other 
words, the clearinghouse would know that its own margining might destroy 
such a thinly capitalized and undiversified firm.   
202  If they do so, then they can foreclose against that collateral 
once the debtor files for bankruptcy and apply the funds towards the 
purchase of a replacement contract.  Individual firms may believe that their 
bankruptcy exemptions are sufficient to minimize counterparty risk, so long 
as they “jump in line” in front of the debtor’s other privileged creditors, 
thus fully collateralizing their losses.  For example, they could try to do so 
by demanding collateral earlier, or by including a broader range of 
triggering events for collateral calls in the swap agreement.  This view 
might appear particularly sensible where other firms are generally not 
diligent in making collateral calls, as was indeed the case before the 
crisis.203
 
 198. See id. at 30 (“Had information been more readily available to regulators and 
counterparties about the scope of AIGFP’s credit default swap positions, regulators and 
market participants might have detected the systemic implications of AIGFP’s book.”). 
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D&O DIARY (Mar. 5, 2008), http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/03/articles/subprime-
litigation/credit-default-swaps-the-newest-subprime-litigation-front/. 
 201. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
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By contrast, a clearinghouse could not believe that it would win a race to 
be first in margining.  This is because a shift toward clearing would subject 
all cleared trades to mandatory, systematic collateral calls.  Although a 
clearinghouse margins daily, and if necessary, intraday, it seems hard to 
imagine that it would want to invest costly resources in securing an early 
place in line.  The more sensible solution is to limit the risk of losses from 
counterparty default ex ante. 
If clearinghouses do have greater incentives to limit counterparty risk, 
then how could they go about doing so?  Dodd-Frank expressly requires the 
imposition of membership eligibility standards.204
In order for clearinghouses to set membership requirements accurately, 
there must be rigorous disclosure of a firm’s aggregate swap positions.  
Otherwise a firm could spread a large, undiversified swap position across 
many different clearinghouses, and create the illusion of financial health.  
As noted above, this was one of the major problems in the bilateral OTC 
market prior to the crisis.
  Under this statutory 
authority, clearinghouses could require members to maintain capital 
adequacy for its swap positions.  If this were too costly, then members 
would simply use fewer derivatives.  Thus, these membership requirements 
could directly address the issue at hand:  limiting losses arising out of 
counterparty default ex ante. 
205
One of the most salient reasons for doubting that clearinghouses will 
have a different set of incentives is that virtually all of the key players in the 
derivatives market prior to the financial crisis have recently entered the 
clearing business.
  Without adequate disclosure, transactions 
between a clearinghouse and its members might create the same risk 
externalities that were observed prior to the recent financial crisis. 
206  If this is the case, one might wonder:  why would 
these firms have any different incentives as central clearing parties than as 
dealers in the OTC market?207  A related concern is the potential influence 
of a clearinghouse’s members over management, a scenario the Department 
of Justice likened to the “three or five largest airlines controlling all landing 
rights at every U.S. airport.”208
 
 204. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 725(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1688 (2010). 
  This could result in a push for lower 
margin requirements and more lax eligibility standards, which would 
entirely undermine the potential for the clearinghouse to contain 
counterparty risk ex ante. 
 205. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text. 
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Regulators should be acutely aware of this tendency, and promulgate 
robust prophylactic rules insuring that each clearinghouse’s board is not 
conflicted with respect to managing the clearinghouse’s financial health.  In 
response to these concerns, and pursuant to requirements of Dodd-Frank, 
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission has proposed rules that 
would limit members’ ownership stakes and require boards to be composed 
of outside directors.209  The Securities and Exchange Commission is 
currently seeking comments on similar proposed rules.210
[a]t a minimum, the public’s interest should be represented by 
membership on the risk committees of major clearinghouses.  Regulatory 
representation, or representation by other public interest organization, 
would legitimize the process as long as resources and expertise were 
provided to challenge decisions such as which derivatives are cleared and 
which are not.
  Commentators 
have proposed additional governance requirements as well.  For example, 
Wallace C. Turbeville has advocated that 
211
Of course, only experience will demonstrate which measures are sufficient.  
Additional regulations might be needed if clearinghouses are not proving 
independent enough to manage counterparty risk prudently. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Swaps are highly useful financial instruments which have been 
developed to hedge against a broad spectrum of business risks, from credit 
to currency, interest rate to commodity price volatility.  When used 
appropriately, they allow institutions to manage those risks more efficiently, 
creating overall wealth gains.  The explosion in their use should come as no 
surprise. 
However, the recent financial crisis has caused market participants to 
seriously reevaluate the proper role of these instruments in the economy.  
Similarly, policymakers should reexamine the various legal reforms which 
were enacted to facilitate their widespread use.  In particular, recent 
scholarship has shown that the original justifications for the Bankruptcy 
Code’s exemptions for derivatives may be misplaced.212
Fortunately, provisions of Dodd-Frank may present an important 
opportunity to strengthen market discipline.  The purpose of this Comment 
is to show which aspects of clearinghouses might be able to mitigate these 
unintended effects of the Code’s swap exemptions, and which most likely 
will not.  Moreover, it highlights some of the key issues that regulators 
should focus on to ensure that clearinghouses are better incentivized to 
  If anything, these 
exemptions likely facilitated the very crisis event that they were enacted to 
prevent by reducing incentives to monitor counterparty risk. 
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prevent the next AIG-type failure.  In particular, regulators should mandate 
standards regarding disclosure of aggregate swap positions to 
clearinghouses, and promulgate strict governance rules designed to preserve 
the board’s independence from its members. 
This feature of clearinghouses should not chill debate over the continuing 
prudence of the Bankruptcy Code’s swap exemptions.  On the contrary, this 
priority status constitutes a remaining structural flaw in the way market 
participants assess counterparty risk.  Moreover, this Comment has 
attempted to show that much of the enthusiasm for the clearing mandate 
may be considerably premature.  But if the coming years demonstrate that 
there is no political constituency for directly addressing these issues, 
clearinghouses just may be our financial system’s greatest hope for 
restoring stability to the swap markets. 
 
 
